- Strong operator: PeerBerry reports no defaults in its history and fully repaid EUR 51.4M of war-affected loans - a real crisis record, not a slogan.
- But it's unregulated, the book is now ~60% real estate, one developer (Si Baltic) is ~29%, and close to half the loans carry buyback but no group guarantee.
- My realized return is 9.2% p.a. I treat it as concentrated credit-and-property exposure, not a diversified marketplace, and size it accordingly.
01What PeerBerry actually is
PeerBerry launched in 2017 as a marketplace for short-term consumer loans, and that's still its reputation. The reality in 2026 is different. By its own statistics (updated 4 June 2026) it has channelled EUR 3.39bn of loans cumulatively, advertises an average return of 11.03%, and carries roughly EUR 134M outstanding. The legal entity is now Peerberry d.o.o., registered in Zagreb, Croatia, with operations run from Vilnius.
The headline figure that should make you sit up: real estate is now 59.65% of the outstanding book. The platform most people still file under "short-term consumer loans" is, today, majority a property lender. That single fact reframes the whole risk picture, so let's follow it.
02The numbers
PeerBerry advertises 11.03%. My own realized, net figure since I started is lower and more honest about what you keep:
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| My realized return (XIRR, net) | 9.2% |
| Platform's advertised average | 11.03% |
| My monthly interest, 2026 range | EUR 71-83 |
| Share of my portfolio | 21.3% |
The gap between my 9.2% and the headline is the usual cash drag between loans. PeerBerry then raised interest rates again in June 2026 - the second adjustment in as many months, with several short-term originators pushed toward 10% (PeerBerry). Rising rates are nice for new money, but worth a sceptical beat: platforms lift rates when they need funding to keep pace with lending. It's a demand-for-capital signal as much as a gift.
03Regulation: there isn't any
Every glossy review buries this. PeerBerry is not regulated - not under MiFID II, not under the EU's ECSP crowdfunding regime (re:think P2P). There's no investor-compensation scheme behind your account. If something breaks, your recourse is the company's promises and the courts, not a regulator.
What makes that pointed: the same people run a regulated sister platform, Crowdpear, which has held an ECSP licence since 2023 (Jean Galea). So the group can clearly operate inside a regulatory perimeter - it just keeps the big consumer-and-property marketplace outside one. As an investor, you're explicitly on the unregulated side of their own house.
04Who you're actually lending to
The standard criticism you'll read elsewhere is "80%+ of loans come from Aventus Group." That figure is out of date. I went through PeerBerry's current originator list and statistics myself and tallied the outstanding balances. Here's the real 2026 picture, by group:
| Group | Focus | Outstanding | Share | Group guarantee |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aventus Group | Consumer, business, some property | ~EUR 55.5M | ~41% | Mostly yes |
| SIB Group (Si Baltic) | Lithuanian real estate | EUR 38.9M | ~29% | No |
| Lithome | Lithuanian real estate | EUR 18.3M | ~14% | No |
| Litelektra | Renewable energy (wind/solar) | EUR 4.3M | ~3% | Yes |
| Gofingo Group | Consumer, business | EUR 2.4M | ~2% | Yes |
| Other / not individually listed | Incl. LLC Pakrantes bustas (real estate) | ~EUR 14M | ~11% | n/a |
| Total | ~EUR 134M | 100% |
So the honest framing isn't "one consumer-loan group." It's two overlapping bets: a related-party bet on Aventus Group (which shares founders and ownership with PeerBerry and writes most of the guarantees) and a concentrated Lithuanian-real-estate bet (Si Baltic, Lithome and the unlisted Pakrantes bustas are well over a third of the book between them). One developer alone - Si Baltic - is ~29% of everything outstanding. Property development is a lumpier, longer-duration risk than the short-term consumer loans PeerBerry built its name on, and it now dominates.
The sub-originators under each group, with their current outstanding balances:
Aventus Group (~EUR 55.5M, ~30 originators in 15+ countries)
The largest by balance: NovaLend (Poland, business, EUR 7.5M - and itself no group guarantee), Credit365 (Moldova, EUR 6.7M), CashXpress (Philippines, EUR 5.6M), Mira Segundo (Spain, real estate, EUR 5.0M), LendPlus (South Africa, EUR 4.4M), Aventus NT (Spain, business, EUR 3.6M), PrimeLoans + CrediWise (South Africa, EUR 2.9M + 2.5M), AutoMoney (Kazakhstan, leasing, EUR 2.8M), Aventus Group (Lithuania, EUR 2.8M), Mira Prima (Spain, real estate, EUR 2.5M). Plus ~20 smaller originators (Kazakhstan, Romania, Mexico, Colombia, Argentina, Peru, Kenya, Nigeria, Spain, Czechia) mostly under EUR 1M each.
SIB Group / Si Baltic (EUR 38.9M, real estate)
A single Lithuanian residential and commercial developer, building since 2008 - and the single biggest exposure on the entire platform at ~29%. Buyback only; no group guarantee.
Lithome (EUR 18.3M, real estate)
Another Vilnius residential developer (13+ years, 1,300+ homes). Buyback only; no group guarantee.
Litelektra (EUR 4.3M, renewable energy)
A Lithuanian wind/solar developer. Business loans, group guarantee applies.
Gofingo Group (EUR 2.4M, consumer/business)
Gofingo (Lithuania) plus SosCredit (Czechia, currently EUR 0). Small today.
One transparency ding worth flagging: PeerBerry's statistics list LLC Pakrantes bustas (a real-estate entity) among its three largest originators, yet it doesn't appear on the main originator page - so roughly EUR 14M / ~11% of the book isn't individually documented where you'd expect it. Not damning, but for a platform that leans on "transparency," it's the kind of gap I notice.
05Where the "double protection" doesn't reach
PeerBerry markets two safety nets: a buyback guarantee (the originator repurchases a loan, with interest, after 60 days late) and a group guarantee (other group companies cover an insolvent one) (PeerBerry). Here's the part the marketing doesn't highlight, straight from the originator table: the two biggest real-estate originators - Si Baltic (~29%) and Lithome (~14%) - carry the buyback guarantee but NOT the group guarantee. Add NovaLend and the unlisted property exposure, and close to half the outstanding book sits behind only a single originator's buyback promise, with no group backstop.
So the "double protection" headline really applies to the Aventus and Gofingo consumer loans - not to the property exposure that's now the majority of the book. And even where the group guarantee does apply, it's circular: the guarantee and the lender are the same group, so in the scenario that actually hurts - the group itself failing - both fail together. Useful against one borrower defaulting; close to worthless against the tail risk that matters.
06The track record that earns it a pass
I've been hard on the structure, so here's the genuine counterweight, and it's strong. PeerBerry reports it has never had a default and no regular loans more than 60 days overdue in its history (PeerBerry). More importantly, when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, PeerBerry had large exposure in both countries - and rather than freeze like several rivals, the group repaid it. Around EUR 51.4M of war-affected loans were returned to investors in full, including the entire Russian book, with no investor losses (Crowdfund Insider).
That episode is the best evidence in the whole sector that this group honours its obligations under real stress, at real cost to itself. It's the reason I hold PeerBerry despite sections 03-05. But note what it proves: willingness, and ability at that moment. It doesn't repeal the concentration - if anything it confirms that under stress, everything routes back to one group's capacity to pay.
07Liquidity - improved, but don't overrate it
For most of its life PeerBerry locked you in until maturity, and in the 2022 panic exits effectively stopped. There's now a secondary market, but the terms are restrictive: you can only sell a loan once you've held it for 180 days, only whole investments can be listed, and you may have to accept a discount of up to 50%. Better than nothing, but a six-month lock-up before you can even attempt to sell means this is not money you can pull on short notice. Treat PeerBerry capital as committed to loan maturity, full stop.
08The emerging-market tail
PeerBerry keeps adding small originators in South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Mexico, Colombia, Kazakhstan and beyond (originator list). Individually these are tiny slices today - mostly under EUR 1M each - so they're not the main risk. But they add currency exposure, weaker local rule of law, and young lenders with no downturn track record. It's marketed as "more choice." Read it as more risk for incremental yield.
09My verdict
PeerBerry is one of the best-run, most reliable, most genuinely investor-aligned operations in European P2P - and it is an unregulated platform whose book has quietly become a concentrated Lithuanian-real-estate bet, close to half of it outside the group guarantee. Both are true at once. The 2022 repayment is the strongest "trust us" evidence anyone in this space has earned; the concentration, the absent regulator, and the property tilt are exactly why "trust us" should never be your whole thesis.
How I actually use it: PeerBerry sits at about 21% of my portfolio, and I think of that not as "one platform of several" but as a concentrated exposure to one lending-and-property group. I size it to the question what happens if Aventus Group and the Vilnius property market both turn at once - because that's closer to the real unit of risk than the originator count suggests - and I keep it well short of a level that would hurt if the answer were ugly. On those terms, a steady 9.2% is a fair price for a risk I've deliberately bounded. Concentrate here and you're not investing, you're trusting. There's a difference.